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GONZALES V. OREGON AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED
SUICIDE: ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES

Ken Levy*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Since 1990, the United States Supreme Court has issued three major decisions on
euthanasia: Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Department of Health,2 Vacco v. Quill,3 and
Washington v. Glucksberg.4 Last term, the Court issued a decision, Gonzales v.
Oregon,5 that discussed euthanasia but turned almost entirely on other issues, primarily
statutory interpretation and the legitimate scope of the United States Attorney General's
authority over medical policy among the fifty States. So Gonzales did not really advance
the euthanasia debate very far. Still, the debate that it did provoke is interesting and
worth further investigation, less for constitutional reasons and more for ethical and
public policy reasons.
The incidental debate focused on whether or not physician-assisted suicide-i.e.,
"a physician['s] facilitat[ing] a patient's death by providing the necessary means and/or
information to enable the patient to perform the life-ending act"6-serves a "legitimate
medical purpose." 7 While the majority held that it does serve a legitimate medical

* J.D., Columbia University Law School; Ph.D., Philosophy, Rutgers University; B.A., Philosophy,
Williams College. Member, New York State Bar. Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law
School. Former Visiting Teaching Fellow, Columbia University Law School. I would like to thank Russell
Christopher, 1.Glenn Cohen, Dr. Lenore Day, Dr. Stuart Levy, and Jed Shugerman for helpful discussions
about physician-assisted suicide; Dr. Robert Cassidy and Dr. Gulay Sezgin for lending me an impressive
collection of literature on physician-assisted suicide; and the editors at the Tulsa Law Review for their
excellent revisions and recommendations.
1. Euthanasia is "commonly defined as the act of bringing about the death of a hopelessly ill and suffering
person in a relatively quick and painless way for reasons of mercy." Council on Ethical & Jud. Affairs,
American Medical Association (AMA), Decisions near the End of Life, 267 J. Am. Med. Assn. 2229, 2229
(1992).
2. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
3. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
4. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
5. 126 S.Ct. 904 (2006).
6. Physician-Assisted Suicide, AMA Code of Ethics § E-2.21 1, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
category/print/8459.html (last updated Aug. 22, 2005); Council on Ethical & Jud. Affairs, supra n. 1, at 2229.
7. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 915 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 830(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2000) and 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04
(2005)). See also Kathleen Foley and Herbert Hendin, Introduction: A Medical, Ethical, Legal, and
Psychosocial Perspective,in The Case againstAssisted Suicide: For the Right to End-of-Life Care (Kathleen
Foley and Herbert Hendin eds., Johns Hopkins U. Press 2002) ("in physician-assisted suicide, the patient selfadministers the lethal dose that has been prescribed by a physician who knows the patient intends to use it to
end his or her life.")
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purpose, Justices Scalia, Roberts, and Thomas took the opposite position in their dissent.
Unfortunately, the majority did not indicate what this legitimate purpose is. So we are
still left to fill in this blank ourselves. This article offers the most obvious way to fill in
this blank-namely, alleviation of suffering.
This article will then survey-and reject-some ethical arguments against
physician-assisted suicide. But the ultimate conclusion of this article is not that
physician-assisted suicide should be legalized. Rather, the ultimate conclusion of this
article is that States should think very long and hard before they follow Oregon's
example and legalize physician-assisted suicide within their own borders. For even if
there are no decisive ethical objections against physician-assisted suicide, it does raise
serious policy worries. Perhaps the most important among them is that the very
legalization of physician-assisted suicide would likely pressure too many terminally ill
patients into exercising this option unnecessarily early and for the wrong reasons-not to
alleviate their own suffering but to minimize the burden, inconvenience, and economic
8
expense that they fear their continued existence would impose on others.
II.

THE ROAD TO GONZALES V. OREGON

The debate about whether or not physician-assisted suicide serves a legitimate
medical purpose has hardly arisen in a vacuum. Rather, it has arisen directly out of the
decisions issued in-and questions unresolved by-three previous cases dealing with the
"right to die": Cruzan, Vacco, and Glucksberg. This part summarizes the issues and
arguments in these decisions, including the concurring and dissenting opinions, that are
related closely enough to physician-assisted suicide.
A.

Cruzan
1.

The Majority

In Cruzan, the majority interpreted the central question to be whether or not Nancy
Cruzan, who had been in an automobile accident that left her in a permanent vegetative
state, had a constitutional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.
Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that she did. According to
Rehnquist, Cruzan had a "constitutionally protected liberty interest" in refusing
unwanted medical treatment, a liberty interest that derives from the Fourteenth
9
Amendment's Due Process Clause.
This conclusion, however, raised a problem. Because Cruzan was in a vegetative
state, it was impossible to ask her directly whether or not she wished to remain on life
support. So her desires had to be ascertained in some other, less direct, way-namely,
from evidence proffered by her family, friends, and guardian ad litem. Chief Justice

8. This article will discuss but not evaluate arguments for and against our having a constitutional right to
physician-assisted suicide. For an eloquent defense of the proposition that a constitutional right to physicianassisted suicide should be recognized, see John Rawls et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers'Brief 44 N Y.
Rev. Bks. 41 (Mar. 27, 1997).
9. 497 U.S. at 278. The Due Process Clause provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1.
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Rehnquist argued that, in order to remove Cruzan's life support, this evidence had to
establish to a "clear and convincing" degree that she wanted, or would have chosen in a
conscious and competent state, to refuse lifesaving medical treatment. For only this high
standard would lead to the correct distribution of the risk of error. On the one hand, if
Cruzan's life support were removed against her wishes, then her right of selfdetermination would be irreversibly violated; once she was dead, there would be no
bringing her back. If, on the other hand, Cruzan's life support continued against her
wishes, then, while her right of self-determination would be violated, this violation
would still be reversible. The possibility would remain that clear and convincing
evidence that Cruzan (would have) wished to die would arrive. And if it did, the hospital
10
could at that time fulfill Cruzan's wishes and remove her life support.
2.

Justice Scalia's Concurrence

In his concurrence, Justice Scalia pointed out that the petitioners, Cruzan's parents,
had a difficult obstacle to overcome. States may clearly pass laws prohibiting suicide
without violating the Due Process Clause. Yet the petitioners were trying to demonstrate
that States like Missouri were violating the Due Process Clause by forbidding Cruzan's
parents from withdrawing her life support. So petitioners had to demonstrate that there is
a distinction between suicide and refusal of lifesaving medical treatment and that this
distinction is constitutionally relevant. Accordingly, petitioners attempted to draw three
distinctions that satisfied both of these criteria. The second of these distinctions, which
only Justice Scalia discussed, was that refusal "would bring on [Cruzan's] death not by
11
any affirmative act but by merely declining treatment that provides nourishment."
"Suicide, it is said, consists of an affirmative act to end one's life; refusing treatment is
not an affirmative act 'causing' death, but merely a passive acceptance of the natural
2
process of dying."'
Justice Scalia correctly identified this distinction as a species of the more general
distinction between "action and inaction," which is more commonly known in
philosophy, criminal law, and tort law as the distinction between positive action and
omission. Justice Scalia then argued that this distinction between positive action and
omission is morally-and therefore constitutionally-irrelevant. For, all else being
equal, action and omission are both intention- and outcome-equivalent. They are merely
different means to the same deliberately-sought end. For example, a parent is equally
guilty of homicide whether she actively poisons her child or deliberately allows her child
starve to death. It does not matter that the parent performs a positive action in one
situation (administering poison) and performs no positive action in the other (stands idly
13
by). Either way, the parent equally intends the child's death and the child equally dies.
Rather than dismissing the positive action-omission distinction entirely, Justice

10. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 283
11. Id. at 295. The two other distinctions were that Cruzan was "permanently incapacitated and in pain"
and that "preventing her from effectuating her presumed wish to die requires violation of her bodily integrity."

Id.
12. Id. at 296
13. /dat296-97
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Scalia made two positive suggestions. First, he suggested that the positive actionomission distinction was not entirely irrelevant, that it "has some bearing upon the
legislative judgment of what ought to be prevented as suicide" and could be "discerned
by logic or legal analysis.'' 14 Second, Justice Scalia suggested that the positive actionomission distinction was not far away from the more appropriate distinction. According
to Justice Scalia, the line should be drawn not between positive action and omission but
rather between "various forms" of omission-namely, omissions "that consist of
abstaining from 'ordinary' care and [omissions] that consist of abstaining from
'excessive' or 'heroic' measures." 15
Curiously, however, Scalia's second suggestion ended there. He did not explain
why this distinction between omission of ordinary measures and omission of heroic
measures is important or relevant. So it is difficult to see exactly what point Justice
Scalia was making. Was he suggesting that withdrawal of life support is constitutionally
protected when, and only when, it involves the omission of heroic measures? Was he
suggesting that the distinction between omission of ordinary measures and omission of
heroic measures is morally relevant but still constitutionally irrelevant? Or something
16
else altogether? It is not clear.
3.

Justice Stevens' Dissent

Two different dissenting opinions were offered, one by Justice Stevens 17 and the
other by Justice Brennan. 18 Justice Brennan's opinion was joined by Justices Marshall
and Blackmun.
Justice Stevens argued that the majority should have assigned greater weight to
Cruzan's own best interests than to the State's interest in preserving and protecting life. 19
The main challenge for Justice Stevens was to demonstrate that withdrawal of life
support was indeed in Cruzan's best interests in the first place. He could not simply
assume this point because it would beg the question against those who believe that life is
always preferable to death and therefore that it is always in a person's best interests to
remain alive as long as possible, even if her life is impoverished to the level of a
persistent vegetative state, than to die. Justice Stevens challenged this position with two
arguments.
First, Justice Stevens argued that whether or not a person has an interest in

14. Id. at 296.
15. Id.
16. The distinction between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" treatments is sometimes thought to align with

the distinction between treatment that ethically must be provided and treatment that morally may be withheld
or withdrawn. See Council on Ethical & Jud. Affairs, supra n. 1, at 2230. But there are two problems with this

position. First, the line between ordinary and extraordinary is difficult to draw. Id. at 2230-3 1. Second, the
ordinary-extraordinary distinction seems to be non-moral; the determination of whether or not a given
treatment is morally obligatory should be determined by moral, not (solely) non-moral, considerations. Id.
17. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 330-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 301-30 (Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
19. See also Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion:An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia,and Individual
Freedom 12-13 (Alfred A. Knopf 1993) (distinguishing between the "detached" claim that a person's life

should be preserved because human life is sacred and the "derivative" claim that a person's life should be
preserved because she has a right to continue, and interest in continuing, to live).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol42/iss3/8

4

Levy: Gonzales v. Oregon and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Ethical and Po
2007]

GONZALES V. OREGON AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE

703

remaining alive depends on whether or not her life has value for her. And, life abstracted
from the person has no value for her. Rather, a person's life has value for her only if it
reaches, or has the potential to reach, a certain minimal degree of quality-namely,
consciousness without inordinate suffering. So if a given person's life does not and
for that
cannot reach this level, such as in Cruzan's case, it does not have sufficient value
20
person and that person therefore does not have an interest in remaining alive.
Second, Justice Stevens offered a two-part argument. First, even if Cruzan did
have an interest in remaining alive, she had other interests that outweighed her interest in
remaining alive. These other interests included how she would be remembered by "those
whose opinions mattered to her," how she would want to be remembered, the integrity of
her body, her dignity, and her personhood. Second, these other interests-which took
precedence over Cruzan's purported interest in staying alive-were better served by
21
withdrawal, rather than continuation, of life support.
Justice Stevens' dissent focused on Cruzan's best interests, which are independent
of her (prior) desires. And independence entails potential conflict. -We often do not want
what is in our best interests. For example, it is in a child's best interests to get certain
vaccinations even if she would prefer not to be pricked with a needle. One problem with
Justice Stevens' position is that he did not explore this possible difficulty. Justice
Stevens' position arguably commits him to the position that a persistent vegetative
patient's best interests trump her (prior-expressed) wishes, whatever they might be. So
even if a patient in a persistent vegetative state previously expressed a desire to stay
indefinitely on life support, Justice Stevens' position arguably entails that this desire is
not dispositive, that the patient should still be terminated if it would better serve the
memories of those close to her, the integrity of her body, her dignity, and her
personhood. This conclusion seems a bit harsh and counterintuitive,
no less inconsistent
22
Clause.
Process
Due
the
by
protected
interest
liberty
the
with
4.

Justice Brennan's Dissent

Perhaps aware of this weakness in Justice Stevens' advocacy of a best-interests
standard, Justice Brennan agreed with the majority that the standard should instead be
Cruzan's autonomy, her self-determination, what she wanted or would have wanted in
her current situation. He agreed with the majority that people like Cruzan have a
23
constitutional "right to be free of unwanted artificial nutrition and hydration."
Still, Justice Brennan diverged from the majority on five main issues. First, he felt

20. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 344-47, 356-57.
21. Id. at 344, 350-51,355-56.
22. Of course, the potential conflict between autonomy and best interests may work in the opposite
direction as well. It may be the case that the patient wishes to die, and this wish conflicts with her best
interests. (Indeed, it is fear of this particular situation that motivates much, if not most, opposition to legalizing
physician-assisted suicide.) Lois Shepherd makes a similar point about the potential conflict between
autonomy and dignity. See Lois Shepherd, Dignity and Autonomy after Washington v. Glucksberg: An Essay
about Abortion, Death, and Crime, 7 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Policy 431,453-55 (1998).
23. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 302. We have now come across three different considerations that are used in
determining whether or not withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment is constitutionally protected: the
patient's autonomy, the patient's best interests, and the intrinsic value or sanctity of the patient's life. See
Dworkin, supra n. 19, at 26, 190-98.
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that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment was not merely an important "liberty
interest" but fundamental.24 Second, he argued that Missouri's interest in preserving life
was not sufficiently important-at least not as important as Cruzan's contrary wish to
discontinue life support. 2 5 Third, Justice Brennan argued that, contrary to both the
Missouri Supreme Court and the majority, the evidence that Cruzan wanted withdrawal
of life support was clear and convincing. 2 6 Fourth, he argued that not only a decision to
discontinue unwanted life support but also a decision to continue life support inflicted
irreversible damage. 2 7 Fifth, he argued that if there is not clear and convincing evidence
regarding what the patient wanted, the decision regarding what to do with the patient
should not automatically "escheat" to the State but should instead be directed to "the
person whom the patient himself would most likely have chosen as proxy or ...the
28
patient's family."
B.

Vacco

In Cruzan, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that even non-terminally ill patients
have the constitutional right to refuse non-lifesaving medical treatment because forced
medical treatment, even though non-lifesaving, would violate their "liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment" just as much as forced lifesaving medical
treatment. 29 It goes without saying that there is an important distinction between the
right to withdraw non-lifesaving medical treatment and physician-assisted suicide: only
the latter will lead to death. So it would not be very convincing for proponents of
physician-assisted suicide to argue that people have a constitutionally protected right to
physician-assisted suicide because (a) withdrawal of any medical treatment is
constitutionally protected and (b) there is no principled distinction between physicianassisted suicide and the withdrawal of any medical treatment. Rather, if this argument is
to have any possibility of success, (a) and (b) should be restricted to lifesaving medical
30
treatment.
In Vacco, it was precisely (b) that was at issue. The central question was whether
or not there is a meaningful distinction between physician-assisted suicide and
withdrawal of unwanted lifesaving medical treatment. 3 1 (As discussed above, in his
Cruzan concurrence, Justice Scalia had the foresight to confront this same issue.)
Respondents offered the following argument for striking down New York State's
ban on physician-assisted suicide: (a) all else being equal, there is no meaningful
difference between physician-assisted suicide and withdrawal of unwanted lifesaving

24.
25.
26.
27.

Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 304-05.
Id at 312-14.
ld.at 319, 321-25.
supra n. 8, at 46.
Id at 320-21; see also Dworkin, supra n. 19, at 196-98; Rawls et al.,

28. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 328 (footnote omitted).
29. Id. at 277-79.
30. See David Orentlicher, The Legalization ofPhysician-AssistedSuicide, 335 New Eng. J.Med. 663, 665
(1996) (noting irony of notion that while a young person depressed from the breakup of a romantic relationship
has the constitutional right to withdrawal of ventilator treatment for her asthma, a very elderly terminally ill
person in great pain does not have the constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide).
31. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 793 (1997).
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medical treatment; (b) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires States to treat like cases alike; 32 therefore, (c) physician-assisted suicide should
receive the same constitutional protection that withdrawal of lifesaving medical
treatment received in Cruzan. But the Court disagreed. Contrary to (a), Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion held that there are meaningful differences between
physician-assisted suicide and withdrawal of unwanted lifesaving medical treatment,
differences that are both "widely recognized and endorsed in the medical profession and
in our legal traditions" and "important and logical ... certainly rational." 33
The first such distinction lies in intent. In both cases, the doctor expects or
foresees that the patient will die sooner than she otherwise would. But in only one of
these situations-physician-assisted suicide-is this result actually intended. The doctor
does not intend this result if she merely withdraws life support. Instead, she intends
"only" to respect her patient's wishes and thereby enable the patient to maintain her
autonomy and dignity. 34 Chief Justice Rehnquist added that what applies to withdrawal
of life support also applies to "aggressive palliative care." 35 Like the former, the latter
may hasten the patient's death-i.e., may lead the patient to die earlier than she would
have without the palliative medication36-"but the physician's purpose and intent is, or
may be, only to ease his patient's pain." 3 7 Rehnquist's theory here is commonly known
as the "Doctrine of Double Effect." The Doctrine of Double Effect holds that actions
producing certain negative outcomes are morally permissible, even if these outcomes
38
were reasonably foreseeable, as long as the outcomes were unintended.
The second distinction lies in causation. Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that how
the doctor helps her patient to die determines the actual cause of the patient's death. On
the one hand, if the doctor helps her patient to commit suicide by prescribing a lethal
medication, then the cause of the patient's death is the medication. On the other hand, if
the doctor withdraws life support, then the cause of the patient's death is the "underlying
fatal disease or pathology." 39 So the patient's death can be directly attributed to the
doctor only in the case of physician-assisted suicide, not in the case of withdrawal of life
40
support.
In his discussion of the second distinction--causation--Chief Justice Rehnquist

32. The Equal Protection Clause provides that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
33 Vacco, 521 U.S. at 800-01 (footnote omitted).
34. Id. at 801-03.

35. Id. at 802.
36. See Leon R Kass, 'I will Give No Deadly Drug' Why Doctors Must Not Kill, in Foley & Hendin, supra
Constitutionally PrescribedSuicide for the
Terminally Ill, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 799, 819 nf. 61, 62 (1994); Student Author, Physician-Assisted
Suicide, I ll Harv. L. Rev. 237, 247 (1997); Shepherd, supra n. 22, at 465 n. 157.

n. 7, at 34, 37; Thomas J. Marzen, "Out, Out Brief Candle
37

Vacco, 521 U.S. at 802.

38. See Kass, supra n. 36, at 36-37; Yale Kamisar, The Rise and Fall of the 'Right' to Assisted Suicide, in
Foley & Hendin, supra n. 7, at 81-82. But see Joan C. Callahan, Acts, Omissions, and Euthanasia, 2 Pub.
Affairs Q. 21 (1988) (arguing that the Doctrine of Double Effect is conceptually and morally problematic).
39. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 801.
40. See also Paul Ramsey, The Patientas Person: Explorations in Medical Ethics 151 (Yale U. Press 1970)
("In omission no human agent causes the patient's death, directly or indirectly. He dies his own death from
causes that it is no longer merciful or reasonable to fight by means of possible medical interventions.").
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actually offered a third distinction: the consequences of prohibition. He argued that the
Cruzan Court determined that patients have a constitutional right to refuse lifesaving
medical treatment on the basis of "well-established, traditional rights to bodily integrity
and freedom from unwanted touching. '4 1 A State that prohibited withdrawal of life
support would effectively be forcing some patients to undergo unwanted lifesaving
medical treatment, which is a form of battery. Rehnquist then implied that the same
cannot be said of physician-assisted suicide. Presumably what he had in mind was that
States' prohibiting doctors from prescribing lethal medication does not force patients to
It
suffer any violations to their "bodily integrity and freedom from unwanted touching."
42
does not force patients to do anything. Instead, it exerts force only upon doctors.
C.

Glucksberg

Vacco was the companion case to Glucksberg. Again, the Vacco Court held that
New York State's prohibition against physician-assisted suicide did not violate
terminally ill patients' Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights. 4 3 In Glucksberg,
Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the State of Washington's prohibition against
physician-assisted suicide did not violate terminally ill patients' Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process rights.
1.

The Majority

Importantly, Chief Justice Rehnquist's decision was not that physician-assisted
suicide violates the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and therefore must be
prohibited. It was only that physician-assisted suicide is not protected by the Due
Process Clause and therefore may be prohibited. Naturally, this proposition is consistent
with a State's decision to permit physician-assisted suicide. As Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded, "Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound
debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our
44
holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society.'
Chief Justice Rehnquist offered several arguments for the majority's conclusion
that physician-assisted suicide is not protected by the Due Process Clause. First, he
argued that while Cruzan held that patients have a constitutional right to refuse unwanted
lifesaving medical treatment, this right does not entail or encompass a further right to
receive assistance from a doctor in terminating their lives. As he did in Vacco,
Rehnquist argued that, despite their superficial resemblance, the two practices are
45
substantively distinct enough to warrant different legal treatment.
Second, Rehnquist argued that if people do not have a right to perform a certain

41. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 807 (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79, 287-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
42 See also New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, When Death Is Sought: Assisted Suicide and
Euthanasia in the Medical Context 105, 113 (2d. ed., Jan. 2000); Orentlicher, supra n. 30, at 663 (describing a
fourth possible distinction "between assisted suicide and the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment ... as a
useful proxy, or substitute, for distinguishing between morally acceptable and morally unacceptable decisions
by patients to end their lives.").
43. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 797.
44 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735.
45. Id. at 724-26.
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action, then they certainly do not have a right to receive assistance in performing that
action. As it turns out, people do not have a right to commit suicide. 46 Therefore people
do not have a right to receive assistance in committing suicide. There are two main
reasons that people do not have a right to commit suicide. The first reason: the
prohibition against suicide is deeply rooted in "our Nation's history, legal traditions, and
practices.''47 Similarly, most States, not to mention most Western democracies, have
criminalized physician-assisted suicide. 48 While not dispositive, this fact certainly casts
some doubt on the notion that physician-assisted suicide is a right, no less a fundamental
right. 49 The second reason: the State has a compelling interest in prohibiting suicidenamely, the preservation of human life, especially life that does not necessarily involve a
50

future of illness and suffering.
Third, Rehnquist argued that, in addition to the preservation of human life, the
State has several other compelling interests that motivate prohibiting physician-assisted
suicide. These other interests include "protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical
profession"; 51 "protecting vulnerable groups-including the poor, the elderly, and
disabled persons-from abuse, neglect .... mistakes ... coercion ... prejudice, negative
and inaccurate stereotypes, and 'societal indifference"';52 and protecting society against
rolling down the slippery slope from physician-assisted suicide to "voluntary and
perhaps even involuntary euthanasia." 53 (These concerns will be discussed further in
Part IV below.)
Regarding this last point, a doctor commits involuntary euthanasia when she
performs euthanasia without the patient's informed consent 54 and voluntary euthanasia
when she performs euthanasia with the patient's informed consent. 55
Because
involuntary euthanasia "would never be ethically acceptable,' 56 we need no further
explanation why Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected it. But why did he reject voluntary
euthanasia as well? Although he did not give the reason, Rehnquist most likely had in
mind scenarios in which a doctor, for her own ulterior reasons, helps suicidal patients to
die unnecessarily early-i.e., when these patients are suffering not from terminal
illnesses or incurable pain but rather from depression that might very well have been
treated. This kind of euthanasia-though voluntary-would still be highly undesirable
because it would lead to the deaths of patients who, had they resisted or been forced to
resist their suicidal impulses, might very well have overcome their depression and gone

46. Id. at 711.
47. Id at 710, 711-14.
48. Id. at 710-11,714-18.
49. Id. at 723, 728; see also Gonzales, Petr.'s Br., 2005 WL 1126079 at *24 (May 12, 2005) (indicating that
"Congress passed a broad ban on the federal funding of assisted suicide" in 1997 and that "physician-assisted
suicide is not eligible for reimbursement under Medicare because it is 'not reasonable and necessary to the
diagnosis and treatment of disease or injury' (citation omitted)).
50. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728-29.
51. Id. at 731.
52. Id. at 731-32 (citation omitted).
53. Id. at 732.
54. Council on Ethical & Jud. Affairs, supra n. 1,at 2229.
55 Id.
56. Id.
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57
on to lead fulfilling and productive lives.

2.

Concurring Opinions

Four Justices-Souter, Breyer, O'Connor, and Stevens--offered concurring
opinions in Glucksberg. All of them drew attention to a third possibility "in between"
physician-assisted suicide, which they agreed is not constitutionally protected, and
refusal of lifesaving medical treatment, which is constitutionally protected.5 8 This third
possibility, which was already discussed in Part I.B above, was a doctor's administering
to terminally ill patients suffering excruciating pain palliative drugs that have the side
effect of hastening death. 59 The point that all four Justices made with this third
possibility is that it is legal, at least in New York and Washington, and therefore renders
physician-assisted suicide unnecessary. Even if doctors do not have the option of
prescribing lethal drugs for terminally ill patients, they may achieve a similar outcome

by prescribing palliative but death-hastening treatment instead. Of course, this argument
would fail for any State that decided to criminalize palliative but death-hastening
treatment.

But because no State has yet legislated any such prohibition, the Justices
60
remained content with the status quo.
3.

Justice Stevens' Concurring Opinion

Justice Stevens was the only member of the Court to recognize that the very

legality of palliative but death-hastening treatment has important implications for what
would later become a central issue in Gonzales:

the purpose of medicine.

Justice

Stevens stated:
The fear is that a rule permitting physicians to assist in suicide is inconsistent with the
perception that they serve their patients solely as healers. But for some patients, it would
be a physician's refusal to dispense medication to ease their suffering and make their death
tolerable and dignified that would be inconsistent with the healing role. . . . [B]ecause
physicians are already involved in making decisions that hasten the death of terminally ill
patients-through termination of life support, withholding of medical treatment, and

57. See also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 782-86 (Souter, J., concurring).
58. ld at 737-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 751 (Stevens, J., concurring), 780 (Souter, J., concurring),
791-92 (Breyer, J., concumng).
59. But see New York State Task Force, supra n. 42, at 109 n. 115 (noting that the National Hospice
Organization has adopted a resolution that "'reaffirms the hospice philosophy that hospice care neither hastens
nor postpones death"' (citation omitted)).
60. But see Vacco, Respt.'s Br., 1996 WL 708912 at **8-9 (Dec. 10, 1996) (citations omitted):
Palliative medication is of course available to ease many patients' physical pain. But it is
undisputed that for others, especially those dying of some forms of cancer and those particularly
near death, it may be impossible to relieve their excruciating pain or other physical symptoms. In
addition, some patients may be unable to receive relief from pain because of their violent physical
or psychological reactions to high doses of opiates. Palliative medication also has no effect on the
suffering that may be brought on by a patient's own anguish, physical degeneration and loss of
dignity. Further, at levels at which it may be effective, such medication may have the effect of
impainng mental acuity. Many patients find-especially near the end--hat they cannot obtain the
required level of pain relief before losing whatever clarity of mind is otherwise left to them for
communicating with loved ones, praying, or coming to terms with their impending death. Although
these patients may be prepared to die, they are confronted instead only with intolerable
suffering-he suffering of their own pain or of opiate-induced oblivion.
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terminal sedation--there is in fact significant tension between the traditional
view of the
61
physician's role and the actual practice in a growing number of cases.
Justice Stevens was groping toward a significant insight. The passage above suggests
that palliative but death-hastening treatment is both consistent and in "significant
tension" with a doctor's "healing role." This apparent opposition, however, can be
dissolved. Justice Stevens' point would have been more effective had he suggested that,
in addition to healing, doctors serve another purpose as well: alleviation of suffering.
For then Justice Stevens would not have had to try to fit the round peg of palliative but
death-hastening treatment into the square hole of healing. Instead, he would have been
able to fit this round peg into the equally round hole of alleviation. Moreover, as will be
shown below, this suggestion would have had the fringe benefit of giving Justice
Kennedy a strong point to use and Justice Scalia a compelling challenge to overcome in
their respective Gonzales opinions.
4.

Justice Souter's Concurring Opinion

In a part of his concurring opinion, Justice Souter strayed from the central
constitutional questions to offer a public policy argument for the conclusion that
criminalization of physician-assisted suicide is preferable to legalization. Justice Souter
argued that some of the State interests mentioned by Chief Justice Rehnquist-namely,
"protecting vulnerable groups" and protecting society against rolling down the slippery
slope from physician-assisted suicide to "voluntary and perhaps even involuntary
euthanasia"-were sufficient reasons for prohibiting physician-assisted suicide. Justice
Souter based his argument on empirical evidence obtained from the Netherlands, one of
the few countries that has legalized physician-assisted suicide. Studies showed that even
Dutch laws permitting physician-assisted suicide that were layered with safeguardslaws "with teeth"-had been unable to prevent these interests from being impaired.
Justice Souter concluded from this data that, until sufficient countervailing evidence
becomes available, the safer course is for States to continue prohibiting physicianassisted suicide rather than passing laws, even "with teeth," that permit this (potentially)
62
dangerous practice.
D.

Gonzales

The central issue in Gonzales was whether or not the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA) 6 3 allowed "the United States Attorney General to prohibit doctors from
prescribing regulated drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide, notwithstanding a state
law permitting the procedure." 64 The Court held that CSA did not grant the Attorney
General this power. Most of its decision was based on the application of canons of
statutory interpretation to the text of CSA.

61.
62.
63.
64.

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 748-49 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 782-87.
Pub. L No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242, as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
Gonzales, 126 S.Ct. at 911.
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Case History

A brief history of Gonzales is in order. In 1994, Oregon became the first State to
pass a ballot measure legalizing physician-assisted suicide. 65 The resulting Death with
Dignity Act (DWDA) 66 exempts from criminal or civil liability state-licensed physicians
who, in compliance with DWDA's safeguards, dispense or prescribe lethal doses of
drugs to terminally ill patients who wish to die. In 1997, Oregon voters reaffirmed
Oregon's DWDA by rejecting a ballot measure proposing to invalidate it.
On November 9, 2001, soon after Senator John Ashcroft had become the United
States Attorney General, he issued a directive (the Ashcroft Directive) declaring that
Oregon's DWDA conflicted with CSA and therefore was invalid.17 CSA, which
Congress passed in 1970, was designed to combat drug abuse and control the legitimate
and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances by creating a comprehensive regulatory
regime criminalizing the unauthorized manufacture, distribution, dispensation, and
possession of substances that are questionable insofar as they have a potential for abuse
or dependence, do not have an accepted medical use, or are not considered sufficiently
safe for use under medical supervision. Attorney General Ashcroft declared that
substances prescribed by doctors for the purpose of assisting terminally ill patients to end
their lives violated CSA.
Therefore, contrary to Oregon's DWDA, "appropriate
administrative action" could still be taken against doctors who issued such prescriptions.
Attorney General Ashcroft based his interpretation of CSA on the application of
two key concepts. The first came from a regulation issued in 1971 by then-Attorney
General John Mitchell, which stated in part: "A prescription for a controlled substance to
be effective must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner
acting in the usual course of his professional practice. ' 68 The second concept came from
a 1984 congressional amendment to CSA, which authorized the Attorney General to
revoke a physician's prescription privileges upon the determination that the physician
has "committed such acts as would render his registration ... inconsistent with the
public interest. ' 69 According to the amendment, an act is "inconsistent with the public
interest" if it, among other things, "threatens the public health and safety." 70 Attorney
General Ashcroft held that substances prescribed for the purpose of assisting suicide fell
within the scope of substances prohibited by CSA because physician-assisted suicide
does not serve a "legitimate medical purpose" and is therefore "inconsistent with the
71
public interest.,
On November 7, 2001, a doctor, a pharmacist, several terminally ill patients, and
the State of Oregon challenged the Ashcroft Directive in the United States Court for the
District of Oregon. On April 17, 2002, Judge Robert E. Jones entered a permanent

65. Similar ballot measures had previously been rejected by voters in California and Washington State and
later rejected by voters in Michigan.
66. Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 127.800-127.995 (2005).
67. 66 Fed. Reg. 56607-56608 (Nov. 9, 2001).
68. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2005).
69. 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4).
70. Id. at § 823(0.
71. Ashcroft Directive, 66 Fed. Reg. at 56608; see also Gonzales, Petr.'s Reply Br., 2005 WL 2083964 at
**2-3, 19-20 (Aug. 25, 2005); Gonzales, Petr.'s Br., supra n. 49, at **18-20.
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injunction against enforcement of the Ashcroft Directive. 72 On May 7, 2003, Attorney
General Ashcroft appealed the injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. On May 26, 2004, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the
injunction on the ground that the Ashcroft Directive "interferes with Oregon's authority
to regulate medical care within its borders and therefore alter[s] the usual constitutional
balance between the States and the Federal Govemment." 73 On November 9, 2004,
Attorney General Ashcroft, who was succeeded the next day by Alberto R. Gonzales,
appealed the Court of Appeals' decision to the United States Supreme Court. 7 4 On
75
January 17, 2006, a divided Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision.
2.

The Majority

Justice Kennedy affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision primarily on the ground
that CSA, appropriately interpreted, did not extend to substances prescribed for the
purpose of physician-assisted suicide. Justice Kennedy said very little about physicianassisted suicide itself. But the little he did say is noteworthy:
In the face of the CSA's silence on the practice of medicine generally and its
recognition of state regulation of the medical profession it is difficult to defend the
Attorney General's declaration that the statute impliedly criminalizes physician-assisted
suicide. . . . A prescription, the Government argues, necessarily implies that the substance
is being made available to a patient for a legitimate medical purpose. The statute, in this
view, requires an anterior judgment about the term "medical" or "medicine." The
Government contends ordinary usage of these words ineluctably refers to a healing or
curative art, which by these terms cannot embrace the intentional hastening of a patient's
death. It also points to the teachings of Hippocrates, the positions of prominent medical
organizations, the Federal Government, and the judgment of the [forty-nine] States that
have not legalized physician-assisted suicide as further support for the proposition that the
practice is not legitimate medicine.
On its own, this understanding of medicine's boundaries is at least reasonable. The
primary problem with the Government's argument, however, is its assumption that the
CSA impliedly authorizes an Executive officer to bar a use simply because it may be
inconsistent with one reasonable understanding of medical practice. Viewed alone, the
prescription requirement may support such an understanding, but statutes "should not be
read as a series of unrelated and isolated provisions." The CSA's substantive provisions
and their arrangement
undermine this assertion of an expansive federal authority to
76
regulate medicine.

Justice Kennedy, then, conceded that one "reasonable" interpretation of the purpose of
medicine is to heal, which includes preventing, curing, and curbing illness, disease, and
injury. But implicit in Justice Kennedy's expression "one reasonable understanding of

72. Or. v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1080 (D. Or. 2002).
73. Id. at 1124 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(brackets in original).
74. Gonzales, No. 04-623 (U.S, filed Nov. 9, 2004).
75. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 926.
76 Id. at 924 (citations omitted).
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medical practice" were the assumptions that, in addition to healing, medicine may serve
another reasonable purpose, and physician-assisted suicide may be consistent with this
other purpose. Unfortunately, Justice Kennedy failed to explain what this alternative
legitimate medical purpose might be. Moreover, Justice Kennedy failed to explain how
it might be the case that physician-assisted suicide does not threaten the public health
and safety and is thereby consistent with the public interest.
3.

The Dissent

Justice Scalia's dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas, capitalized on these omissions. 77 The majority's failure to offer a legitimate
medical purpose other than healing or an explanation of how physician-assisted suicide
might not threaten the public health and safety left Justice Scalia free to claim victory for
the Attorney General's unchallenged interpretations:
[E]ven if [the Attorney General's] interpretation of ["legitimate medical purpose"] is
entitled to lesser deference or no deference at all, it is by far the most natural interpretation
of [this phrase]--whose validity is not challenged here. This interpretation is thus correct
even upon de novo review. [And] even if that interpretation of ["legitimate medical
purpose"] were incorrect, the Attorney General's independent interpretation of the
statutory phrase "public interest" in 21 U.S.C. §§ 824(a) and 823(0, and his implicit
interpretation of the statutory phrase
"public health and safety" in § 823(f)(5), are entitled
78
to deference ... and they are valid.
Justice Scalia spent most of his opinion explaining why deference should be given
to the Attorney General's interpretation of CSA and of its incompatibility with
physician-assisted suicide. For the most part, he argued that deference was owed to the
Attorney General not necessarily because his interpretations were correct but because
U.S.A.,
both the text of CSA and prior cases-namely 80Auer v. Robbins 79 and Chevron
81
Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc. -mandated this deference.
Still, Justice Scalia did maintain that, regardless of deference issues, the Attorney
General's interpretations were correct. In particular, Justice Scalia offered three quick
arguments-or, more precisely, one argument and two assertions-in defense of the
Attorney General's thesis that the only legitimate medical purpose is healing and
therefore that CSA clearly ruled out physician-assisted suicide. Justice Scalia's only
argument was to reiterate the Attorney General's own appeal to authority. Justice Scalia
stated that "[v]irtually every relevant source of authoritative meaning," including
"virtually every medical authority from Hippocrates to the current American Medical

77. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 926 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
78 Id. at 926 (citations omitted).
79. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
80. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
81. In his separate dissent, Justice Thomas also argued that deference should be given to the Attorney
General's interpretations of CSA. Like Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas argued that this deference was mandated
by CSA. Id at 940 (Thomas, J. dissenting). But Justice Thomas also argued that the Supreme Court's decision
in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. I (2005)--a case that entailed the Attorney General's interpretations of
CSA-was inconsistent with the majority's decision in Gonzales. Id. at 939-41.
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Association (AMA)," suggests that the sole purpose of medicine is to heal. 82 The first of
Justice Scalia's assertions was that "[n]ot even those of our Eighth Amendment cases
most generous in discerning an 'evolution' of national standards would have found, on
this record, that the concept of 'legitimate medicine' has evolved so far." 83 The second
of Justice Scalia's assertions was that healing is the only meaning that "legitimate
medical purpose" could have, and this meaning "surely excludes the prescription of
drugs to produce death."84

III.

ETHICAL ISSUES

It is not clear whether or not there is a larger significance to Justice Kennedy's
point in Gonzales that there may be legitimate medical purposes other than healing. At
the very least, Justice Kennedy is suggesting that the worry that physician-assisted
suicide is incompatible with a doctor's role as healer is not dispositive, that States may
still permit physician-assisted suicide without necessarily violating the fundamental
purposes of medicine. But is this point also meant to reopen the very door that Vacco
and Glucksberg apparently closed? Again, Vacco and Glucksberg both held that
terminally ill patients do not have a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide. Is
Gonzales meant to be the first step in undoing Vacco and Glucksberg and revisiting this
question?
Of course, we can only speculate as to what the Court's underlying motivations are
and how it will decide future cases questioning the constitutionality of laws either
permitting or prohibiting physician-assisted suicide. This article does not attempt to
engage in any such psychoanalysis or palm reading. Instead, it remains on the safer
ground of argument and textual interpretation. The thesis of this part is that, whether or
not the Court intends to reconsider if terminally ill patients have a constitutional right to
physician-assisted suicide, it has not offered theoretically satisfying answers to two
critical questions. The first question: does physician-assisted suicide have a legitimate
medical purpose?
The second question: is there a meaningful morally relevant
distinction between physician-assisted suicide, which the Court stated in Vacco and
Glucksberg may be criminalized, and withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment, which
the Court stated in Cruzan is a constitutionally protected right?
A.

Does Physician-AssistedSuicide Have a Legitimate Medical Purpose?

In Glucksberg, there was a scuffle between Justices Kennedy and Scalia over
whether or not physician-assisted suicide serves a legitimate medical purpose. Justice
Kennedy suggested that it may but failed to mention what this legitimate medical
purpose might be. And Justice Scalia suggested that the only legitimate medical purpose
is healing and therefore that physician-assisted suicide, which is designed not to heal but
to do the very opposite-kill--falls outside the legitimate boundaries of medicine.

82. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 932; see also Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra n. 6; New York State Task
Force, supran. 42, at 105-08.
83. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 932 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).

84. Id. at 939.
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The Hippocratic Oath

Justice Scalia based his position that physician-assisted suicide does not serve a
legitimate medical purpose largely on a June 27, 2001 memorandum from the Office of
Legal Counsel at the U.S. Department of Justice to Attorney General Ashcroft (OLC
Memorandum). 85 The OLC Memorandum derived this position from a number of
sources, including the AMA and the American Nurses Association. 86 These agencies
themselves relied largely on the Hippocratic Oath.
There are two versions of the Hippocratic Oath-ancient and modem. The ancient
version, which was written in the fifth century B.C. by Hippocrates, states in part that
"[n]either will I administer a poison to anybody when asked to do so, nor will I suggest
such a course. ' 87 The modem version, written by Dr. Louis Lasagna in 1964, states in
part:
Most especially must I tread with care in matters of life and death. If it is given to me to
save a life, all thanks. But it may also be within my power to take a life; this awesome
responsibility must be faced with88 great humbleness and awareness of my own frailty.
Above all, I must not play at God.
The ancient version directly conflicts with physician-assisted suicide. But there
are several reasons why the ancient version does not present a very strong basis for
current opposition to physician-assisted suicide. First, candidates for the license to
practice medicine no longer recite, or need to recite, the ancient version. 89 Rather, they
generally recite the modem version. 90 Second, Hippocrates inserted the clause above
("[n]either will I ... such a course") into the oath largely to "prevent[] physicians from
participating in political intrigues." 9 1 This concern is no longer relevant. Third, there is

85. Memo. from U.S. Dept. of Just., Off. of Leg. Counsel, to Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft, Whether PhysicianAssisted Suicide Serves a "Legitimate Medical Purpose" under the Drug Enforcement Administration's
Regulations Implementing the ControlledSubstances Act (June 27, 2001) Others who base their opposition to
physician-assisted suicide at least in part on the Hippocratic Oath include the Council on Ethical & Jud.
Affairs, Physician-AssistedSuicide, 10 Issues L. & Med. 91 (1994); Willard Gaylin, Leon R. Kass, Edmund D.
Pellegrino & Mark Siegler, "Doctors Must Not Kill", 259 J. Am. Med. Assn. 2139 (1988); John C. Harvey,
Doctors Must Not Kill, Am. J. Ethics & Med. 9 (1993); Leon R. Kass, Neither for Love nor Money: Why
Doctors Must Not Kill, 94 Pub. Interest 25 (1989); Kass, supra n. 36, at 31-32; Charles L. Sprung, Changing
Attitudes and Practicesin ForgoingLife-SustainingTreatments, 263 J. Am. Med. Assn. 2211 (1990); Avraham
Steinberg, The Terminally Ill--Secularand Jewish EthicalAspects, 30 Isr. J. Med. Sci. 130 (1994); see also
Stephen Jamison, Assisted Suicide: A Decision-Making Guidefor Health Professionals20 (Jossey-Bass 1997);
Ernld W.D. Young, Physician-AssistedSuicide: Overview of the Ethical Debate, 166 W. J. Med. 402, 403-04
(1997).
86. OLC Memorandum, supra n. 85, at 11-13. The AMA stated its position in Glucksberg, Amicus Br.,
1996 WL 656263 (Nov. 12, 1996), and in H.R. Subcomm. on Const. of the H. Comm. on the Jud., Assisted
Suicide in the United States, 104th Cong. 521-66 (Apr. 29, 1996) (testimony of Lonnie L. Bristow, M D., Pres.,
AMA) (available at 1996 WL 226114). The American Nurses Association stated its position at the same
hearing and in its Position Statement on Assisted Suicide, http://www.nursingworld.org/readroom/
position/ethics/ prtetsuic.htm (Dec. 8, 1994).
87. Ethics in Medicine: HistoricalPerspectivesand Contemporary Concerns5 (Stanley Joel Reiser, Arthur
J. Dyck & William J. Curran eds., student ed., MIT Press 1977).
88. Nova Online, Hippocratic Oath--Modern Version, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/
oath modem.html (updated Mar. 2001).
89. Nova Online, The Hippocratic Oath Today. Meaningless Relic or Invaluable Moral Guide,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/ oathtoday.html (updated Mar. 2001).
90. Id.
91. Erich H. Loewy, Textbook of Medical Ethics 146 (Plenum Publg. Corp. 1989).
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no good reason to think that Hippocrates is a definitive, authoritative source on the
fundamental principles of medical ethics. His view is just as contestable as any other
medical ethicist's view.92 Fourth, the principles of medical ethics are not necessarily
timeless but rather vary with context, society, and technology. These three things have

dramatically changed since Hippocrates' time.
Unlike the ancient version, the modem version does not clearly rule out physicianassisted suicide. First, to suggest that a physician must "tread with care in matters of life
and death" still leaves open the possibility of a physician's carefully terminating her

patient's life.

Second, the suggestion that the "awesome responsibility" of "tak[ing] a

life" "must be faced with great humbleness and awareness of my own frailty" directly
suggests that the physician must sometimes decide whether or not to take a patient's life,
which itself implies that the physician is sometimes morally permitted to decide in favor
of termination. Third, if the statement that the physician "must not play at God" were
taken to be a categorical ban on physician-assisted suicide, then it would contradict the
previous statements'

implications, which have just been noted above. 9 3

Given the

previous statements, a more plausible interpretation of this last statement is that the
physician should not make the decision based solely on her own judgment. Rather, she
should also take into account the wishes, interests, and circumstances of the patient and
the patient's family.

Finally, many physicians who have subscribed to the principles

embodied by the Hippocratic Oath believe that physician-assisted suicide is morally
permissible. 9 4 And it would be both highly cynical and arrogant to think that any, no

92 This third argument applies not merely to modem society but also to the ancient Greeks themselves.
According to Erich H. Loewy and Roberta Springer Loewy, The Ethics of Terminal Care- Orchestrating the
End of Life 107 (Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers 2000), many physicians in ancient times did not
subscribe to Hippocrates' medical ethical principles. See also Darrel W. Amundsen, The Significance of
InaccurateHistory in Legal Considerationsof Physician-AssistedSuicide, in Physician-AssistedSuicide 3, 2526 (Robert F. Weir ed., Ind. U. Press 1997) (maintaining that the early Christians did not categorically reject
the practices of euthanasia, suicide, and physician-assisted suicide but instead barely discussed or considered
them).
93. Jean Davies makes a very interesting observation in this context:
The emptiness of [assertions like "[o]nly God can give or take life" and "[w]e cannot play God"] in
relation to actual medical practice can be seen in the determined (and laudable) attempts that are
made to restore to health those hovering on the brink of death by reason of accident or treatable
infection. In fact the whole practice of medicine could be defined as one long struggle to prevent
"Nature taking its course."
Jean Davies, The Case for Legalizing Voluntary Euthanasia,in Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and
Legal Perspectives 83, 90 (John Keown ed., Cambndge U. Press 1995).
94. Physicians who support physician-assisted suicide include Lofty L. Basta & Carole Post, A Graceful
Exit- Life and Death on Your Own Terms (Insight Bks. 1996); Loewy & Loewy, supra n 92. Orentlicher,
supra n. 30, at 666, offers evidence that there is widespread support for physician-assisted suicide among
modem physicians. See also Melinda A. Lee & Susan W. Tolle, Oregon'sAssisted Suicide Vote: The Silver
Lining, 124 Annals Internal Med. 267 (1996). Harold Y. Vanderpool, Doctors and the Dying of Patients in
American History, in Physician-AssistedSuicide 33, 37 (Robert F. Weir ed., Ind. U. Press 1997), points out
that, far from uniformly opposing euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, the medical community has hotly
contested these issues since at least the 1870s. Vanderpool also offers the names of many physicians and
medically related organizations that have practiced or advocated euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide
since that time. In more or less chronological order, they include Samuel D. Williams, T.T. Robertson, the
American Association of Progressive Medicine, Alfred Worchester, William Sperry, Walter C. Alvarez, Joseph
Fletcher, Edward H. Rynearson, Frank J. Ayd, Paul Ramsey, Norman L. Cantor, Thomas W. Furlow, Jr., the
1983 Report of the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, Sisella Bok, Derek Humphry, the Hemlock Society, and the Unitarian Universalist
Association.
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less all, of these physicians are guilty of either unwitting self-contradiction or false
consciousness.
2.

The Fundamental Purposes of Medicine

When they are not appealing to the Hippocratic Oath, the sources that Justice
Scalia cites in favor of the proposition that healing is the only purpose of medicine
appeal to something even weaker-bald assertion. They merely assert that the only
95
purpose of medicine is to heal-to prevent, cure, or curb illness, disease, and injury.
This objective clearly conflicts with physician-assisted suicide, which is designed to do
the very opposite-not heal the patient but end her life.
This perspective, however, is myopic. In addition to healing, medicine has at least
one other main purpose: to alleviate physical or emotional suffering. One need merely
consider the universal acceptance of palliative care (e.g., hospice treatment). 96 And
when it comes to terminally ill patients who suffer excruciating pain and wish to die, the
"healing purpose" may conflict with the "alleviation purpose." That is, a physician
treating a terminally ill patient who is suffering excruciating pain and wishes to die may
not be able to satisfy both purposes. In this limiting case, she may just have to choose
between them. She may just have to violate a fundamental purpose of medicine. On the
one hand, if she opts for healing the patient, she may thereby prolong or intensify the
patient's physical and emotional suffering. On the other hand, the only way in which the
physician may be able to alleviate the patient's suffering is by terminating her life. So it
is disingenuous for opponents of physician-assisted suicide to suggest that it violates a
fundamental purpose of medicine. In certain situations, failing to terminate the patient's
97
life might also violate a fundamental purpose of medicine.

Non-physicians who also support physician-assisted suicide include Margaret Pabst Battin, The Least
Worst Death: Essays in Bioethics on the End of Life (Oxford U. Press 1994); Raphael Cohen-Almagor, The
Right to Die with Dignity: An Argument in Ethics, Medicine, and Law (Rutgers U. Press 2001); Davies, supra

n. 93.
95. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 931-32 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
96. Even the Ashcroft Directive, 66 Fed. Reg. at 56608, recognizes this point: "Pain management ... has
long been recognized as a legitimate medical purpose justifying physicians' dispensing of controlled
substances." See also Daniel Callahan, Reason, Self-determination, and Physician-AssistedSuicide, in Foley &
Hendin, supra n. 7, at 59 ("What [medicine] can do is relieve pain and bring comfort to those who
psychologically suffer because of illness."); Kass, supra n. 36, at 21 ("[T]he physician is called to serve the
high and universal goal of health while also ministering to the needs and relieving the sufferings of the frail and
particular patient.").
97 See Cohen-Almagor, supra n. 94, at 184-85, 186; Jamison, supra n. 85, at 19-20, 24-25; Loewy &
Loewy, supra n. 92, at 113-14; Howard Brody, Assisted Death--A Compassionate Response to a Medical
Failure,327 New Engl. J. Med. 1384 (1992); Council on Ethical & Jud. Affairs, supra n. 1,at 2230; Ezekiel J.
Emanuel, Euthanasia: Historical,Ethical, and Empiric Perspectives, 154 Archives Internal Med. 1890, 1893
(1994); Institute of Medical Ethics Working Party on the Ethics of ProlongingLife and Assisting Death, 336
Lancet 610, 613 (1990); Winston Nesbitt, Euthanasiaand the Distinction between Acts and Omissions, 10 J.
Applied Phil. 253 (1993); Orentlicher, supra n. 30, at 664; Robert F. Weir, The Morality of Physician-Assisted
Suicide, 20 L., Med. & Health Care 116, 123 (1992). But see Kass, supra n. 36, at 34-35 (challenging the
notion that medicine serves the goal, among others, of "helping patients achieve a peaceful death").

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol42/iss3/8

18

Levy: Gonzales v. Oregon and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Ethical and Po
2007]

B.

GONZALES V. OREGON AND PHYSICIA N-ASSISTED SUICIDE

717

Is There a Morally Relevant Distinction between Physician-AssistedSuicide and
Withdrawal of Lifesaving Medical Treatment?

The Vacco Court held that there is a significant moral (and constitutional)
difference between a doctor's withdrawing lifesaving medical treatment from a
terminally ill patient and a doctor's prescribing lethal drugs for a terminally ill patient. Is
98
this decision correct? Is there really a difference? If so, what is it?
We have already come across three proposed answers to these questions from
Chief Justice Rehnquist in his Vacco opinion. First, while a doctor who prescribes lethal
drugs to her patient intends to help her die, a doctor who withdraws life support from her
patient intends only to respect the patient's autonomy and dignity. Second, while
physician-assisted suicide involves the patient's dying from the drug prescribed by her
doctor, withdrawal involves the patient's dying from the underlying illness. Third, only
prohibiting withdrawal, not prohibiting physician-assisted suicide, violates the patient's
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest.
1.

The First Distinction: Intent

The first two distinctions are quite weak. Regarding intent, a physician who
prescribes lethal drugs to her patient is not necessarily, or usually, some evildoer who
rubs her hands together with glee at the prospect that her patient might soon be dead.
And even if we assume that she is, we have no reason not to assume the same about the
doctor who withdraws her patient from life support, in which case this practice should be
illegal as well. If, however, we assume what we should-namely, that the doctor who
fulfills her patient's wishes to remove life support does so almost invariably not from
some evil motive but simply out of a respect and concern for her patient's autonomythen we have no reason not to assume the very same about the doctor who prescribes
lethal drugs for her patient. We have no reason not to assume that she prescribes lethal
drugs out of the very same respect and concern for her patient's autonomy. But if we
may-and should-make these assumptions, then Chief Justice Rehnquist's first
distinction fails. All else being equal, there is no difference between the intent of a
doctor who removes unwanted lifesaving medical treatment from her patient and the
99
intent of a doctor who prescribes lethal drugs for her patient.
2.

The Second Distinction: Causation

Regarding causation, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated what is undeniable-namely,
that the cause of the death of a patient from whom lifesaving medical treatment is

98. See Dworkin, supra n. 19, at 184 (footnote omitted):
[T]he law produces the apparently irrational result that people can choose to die lingering deaths by
refusing to eat, by refusing treatment that keeps them alive, or by being disconnected from
respirators and suffocating, but they cannot choose a quick, painless death that their doctors could
easily provide. Many people, including many doctors, think that this distinction is not irrational but,
on the contrary, essential. They think that doctors should in no circumstances be killers. But to
many other people, that principle seems cruelly abstract.
99. David Lavalle makes a similar point about the patient's intent. David Lavalle, Physician-Assisted
Suicide- Is There a Right to Die? 31 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 945, 973 (1998).
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withdrawn is her underlying illness. Where Rehnquist went wrong was in assuming that
the cause of such a patient's death must be confined to only one causal factor. In fact,
there is another-quite obvious-factor that equally contributed to this patient's death:
removal of her life support. Once we acknowledge this second, equally important,
causal factor, the purported distinction that Chief Justice Rehnquist drew between
causation by physician-assisted suicide and causation by withdrawal breaks down
entirely. For just as it is misleading to say that the cause of the death of a patient from
whom life support has been removed is her underlying illness, it is equally misleading to
say that the cause of the death of a patient who has administered to herself a lethal drug
prescribed by that doctor is the lethal drug. Clearly, her terminal illness also plays a
causal role. It causes her the great suffering that motivates her to take the drug in the
first place. 100
Opponents of physician-assisted suicide might argue that this description
overlooks an obvious temporal distinction between the two cases. On the one hand,
when the doctor removes life support, the patient normally does not die immediately.
There is some gap of time, however small, between the removal of life support and the
patient's death. What intervenes in that gap is the patient's illness. So it is more precise
to say that the patient's illness is the immediate cause of her death, removal of life
support "only" the distant cause. And in this sense, the cause of the patient's death is her
illness. The same, however, cannot be said of the patient who commits suicide by means
of a lethal drug prescribed by her doctor. The immediate cause-and therefore the
cause-of her death is the drug itself, not her illness.
But this is a distinction without a difference. The point of Rehnquist's distinction
between causation-of-death in the physician-assisted suicide scenario and causation-ofdeath in the withdrawal scenario is that the latter is somehow more benign, and therefore
more tolerable, than the former. But it is arbitrary to make this normative judgment
about benignity or tolerability on the basis of the immediate cause alone. There is no
good reason to think that the immediate cause alone carries such importance. On the
contrary, if causation is to be considered at all, this normative judgment should instead
be based not merely on the immediate cause but on the larger process or causal history or
chain of events behind this immediate cause. Once we take this larger chain of events
into consideration, we see that the two scenarios should be judged equally. For both
chains of events share two key features-both of which are sufficient to determine our
normative judgments. First, the patient's wishes initiate both chains of events. It is the
patient who asks her doctor to remove life support or to prescribe lethal drugs. Second,
in both chains of events, the doctor serves as merely a means to the end of fulfilling the
patient's wishes. It does not matter how she fulfills the patient's wishes, whether by
removing life support or by prescribing lethal drugs. This is merely a technical issue, not
10 1
a moral issue.

100. Id. at 973.
101. It might be objected that it does matter how the doctor fulfills the patient's wishes. Clearly, if the

patient wishes to die, the doctor may not fire a pistol at her. And this is so even if the patient wishes to be shot

to death. But this objection requires only a simple qualification. The doctor must use non-violent means to
achieve the end of fulfilling her patient's wish to die. Prescribing a lethal drug clearly qualifies as non-violent
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Opponents of physician-assisted suicide might respond that we should focus
exclusively on the immediate cause of death because that will tell us whether the patient
died from natural causes or from human intervention. And it is clearly preferable that
patients die from natural causes than from human intervention.
While this argument is rhetorically seductive, it is substantively bankrupt. It is
But it is
rhetorically seductive because it relies on very powerful connotations.
substantively bankrupt because these connotations are inapplicable in the context of
On the one hand, death by natural causes connotes
physician-assisted suicide.
peacefulness and unavoidability. On the other hand, death by human intervention
But, again, these connotations are simply
connotes violence and avoidability.
inapplicable in this context. While a death by prescribed lethal drugs is a death by
human intervention-the doctor and the patient herself-it is certainly not violent. It is
therefore not deplorable, even if it is tragic. Moreover, if one argues that death by
natural causes is preferable to physician-assisted suicide, then one is in effect making the
arguably cruel suggestion that patients should be forced to endure longer, possibly much
longer, periods of suffering for no better reason than to avoid the pejorative implications
of human intervention, implications that simply do not apply in the context of euthanasia.
Finally, opponents of physician-assisted suicide might argue that the causal
distinction between death by physician-assisted suicide and death by removal of life
support is morally relevant. For a doctor who practices physician-assisted suicide helps
to kill her patient. But a doctor who removes life support from her patient merely lets
killing and letting die. All
herpatientdie. And there is a clear moral difference between
102
die.
letting
than
worse
(much)
is
killing
equal,
else being
There are, however, two problems with this argument against physician-assisted
suicide. First, not everybody agrees with it. 103 On the contrary, whether or not, all else
being equal, killing is worse than letting die is a very difficult and hotly contested
philosophical question.l°4 Because it is so difficult and contested, it (alone) should not
be allowed to decide the debate on physician-assisted suicide.
Second, in the context of euthanasia, the distinction between killing and letting die

because it does not inflict any external injury on the patient and may be self-administered by the patient.
102. For example, before Vacco went up to the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held
that there is no pnncipled distinction between physician-assisted suicide and withdrawal of lifesaving medical
treatment. In particular, it held that New York statutes that allowed the withdrawal of lifesaving medical
treatment but prohibited physician-assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection Clause. Quill v. Vacco, 80
F.2d 716, 727 (2d Cir. 1996). For terminally ill patients on life-support systems are similarly situated to
terminally ill patients who are not. So the only justification for allowing only the former to terminate their
lives would be a rationally related legitimate State interest. Id. at 729. According to the Second Circuit, such

an interest simply does not exist. Id. at 729-30.
103. For example, before Vacco went up to the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held
that there is no principled distinction between physician-assisted suicide and withdrawal of lifesaving medical
treatment. In particular, it held that New York statutes that allowed the withdrawal of lifesaving medical
treatment but prohibited physician-assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection Clause. Quill v. Vacco, 80
F.2d 716, 727 (2d Cir. 1996). For terminally ill patients on life-support systems are similarly situated to
terminally ill patients who are not. So the only justification for allowing only the former to terminate their
lives would be a rationally related legitimate State interest. Id. at 729. According to the Second Circuit, such

an interest simply does not exist. Id. at 729-30.
104. See, for example, the variety of positions represented in Killing and Letting Die (Bonnie Steinbock and
Alastair Norcross, eds., Fordham University Press 1994).
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is not always clear. There are borderline situations that do not fall easily or obviously on
either the "killing side" or the "letting die" side. Indeed, one situation that is not easily
classified as either a killing (a positive action bringing about another's death) or a letting
die (a failing to prevent another's death by refraining from performing a life-saving
action) is withdrawal of life support itself. On the one hand, it may seem to be a letting
die because, in terminating the life support, the physician is failing to prevent the
patient's impending death. On the other hand, it may seem to be a killing because
terminating the life support involves a positive action by the physician.
The underlying problem is that we have no principled basis for determining the
proper baseline-namely, whether or not the patient is already moving toward death. On
the one hand, if we deem the patient already to be moving toward death, then the life
support system constitutes an active interference. It does not continue but interrupts the
movement. So if the physician terminates the life support, she merely removes this
interruption and thereby lets the movement toward death continue. And to say that she
lets the movement toward death continue is just to say that she lets the patient die. On
the other hand, if we deem the patient not already to be moving toward death, then the
physician's removing the life support system constitutes an active interference. She
actively interrupts the patient's movement toward more life, in which case she may be
said to kill the patient.
3.

The Third Distinction: The Consequences of Prohibition

Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist's third distinction-that prohibiting only
withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment, not physician-assisted suicide, would violate
patients' "well-established, traditional rights to bodily integrity and freedom from
unwanted touching"l 0 5-fails because it falsely assumes that the constitutional right to
withdraw unwanted lifesaving medical treatment derives from "well-established,
traditional rights to bodily integrity and freedom from unwanted touching." In fact, the
majority opinion in Cruzan, which was also written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, did not
really advance this proposition. Instead, Cruzan stated that patients' right to withdraw
lifesaving medical treatment derived from the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
10 6
Clause, which secured their "liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment."
So the right to withdraw unwanted lifesaving treatment was thought to derive not from a
concern to protect bodily integrity per se but rather from a concern to protect liberty,
which may safely be translated as a right to self-determination. 10 7 Indeed, the text of
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Cruzan contains only one mention of "bodily
integrity," as contrasted with thirteen mentions of "liberty interest."
Given this clarification, Rehnquist's third distinction collapses. Even if prohibiting
physician-assisted suicide does not violate terminally ill patients' bodily integrity, it
might still violate their right to self-determination. Because it might violate this right
just as much as does prohibiting withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment, and because
105. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 807 (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79, 287-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring))
106. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
107. See also Rawls etal., supra n. 8, at 44 ("The liberty interest at stake in Cnzan was a more profound

one" than "a right to reject an unwanted invasion of one's body.").
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prohibiting withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment is unconstitutional precisely
prohibition of physician-assisted suicide
because it violates this right, it follows that
108
well.
as
unconstitutional
be
well
very
might
One might object that this point leads to an absurdity. If terminally ill patients had
a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide, then the State would be equally
constitutionally obligated to provide a physician to each patient who sought this
treatment and did not already have a doctor of her own. But is difficult to accept the
notion that States would be constitutionally obligated to provide this affirmative medical
have a
assistance-especially when, for better or worse, they do not otherwise
it. 10 9
constitutional obligation to provide health care to those who cannot afford
The appropriate response to this objection is that constitutional protection of
physician-assisted suicide would not entail the positive right to be provided with a doctor
if need be. Rather, it would entail only the negative right of non-interference-i.e., the
right that States not interfere with any arrangements for physician-assisted suicide made
1
by patients with their own doctors. 10
IV.

POLICY ISSUES

Even though the Court ruled in Vacco and Glucksberg that patients do not have a
constitutionally protected right to receive physician-assisted suicide, it does not at all
follow that States should prohibit physician-assisted suicide. There are many actions and
activities that are not constitutionally protected and yet are-and should be-perfectly
legal. For example, individuals do not have a constitutional right to drive (no less have)
a car. Yet it would be foolish for any State to interpret this absence of constitutional
protection as a good reason to outlaw driving. In this respect, physician-assisted suicide
is like driving. While we do not currently have a constitutional right to it, some
advocates of physician-assisted suicide argue that we should still be permitted this option
if we are ever in the unfortunate position of facing a future of unrelenting pain before a
certain death.
Why, then, does every State but Oregon still prohibit physician-assisted suicide?
While some opposition to legalizing physician-assisted suicide may be rooted in some of

108 See also Crzan, 497 U.S. at 298-99 (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting Chief Justice Rehnquist's third
distinction because its assumption that the State may not violate a patient's bodily integrity to save her life is
both question-begging and, in many cases, false). Respondents in Vacco offered another argument against the
third distinction:
[Patients who have previously consented to bodily intrusions such as insertion of an artificial heart
valve or a kidney or bone marrow transplant] may wish to die by withdrawing their consent to the
bodily intrusion to which they have been subjected. But their cases demonstrate that the State's line
is not about permitting patients to undo a battery. Even where withdrawal of consent is theoretically
possible, the State would doubtless say that a patient has no right to end his own life by insisting, for
example, that surgeons remove a donor kidney or heart that had already been implanted. On the
other hand, if the State did permit this type of life-ending physician assistance, how could it argue
that it is rational not to permit the same patient to obtain a lethal dose of medication from a

physician for the same ultimate purpose?
Vacco, Respt.'s Br., supra n. 60, at 47 (emphasis in original).
109. See, e.g. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (The Due Process Clause does not impose an
obligation on the government to fund abortions or other medical services.).
110. Orentlicher, supra n. 30, at 664.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2006

23

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 42 [2006], Iss. 3, Art. 8
TULSA LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 42:699

the weaker arguments that we have encountered above-e.g., physician-assisted suicide,
unlike withdrawal of unwanted life support, involves killing or the intent to kill-the
stronger arguments derive less from moral considerations and more from a practical
worry. The practical worry is that legalizing physician-assisted suicide will have serious
negative effects on patients, physicians, medical practice, and society in general. This
part will explicate what these negative effects might be.
A.

The Strongest Policy Arguments for Physician-AssistedSuicide

It would help first to see the strongest policy arguments for physician-assisted
suicide. Suppose an elderly woman-Lisa-is terminally ill with no chance of recovery,
suffers excruciating pain, and has decided, after much careful thought and deliberation
with her family and friends, that she wishes to die. Suppose also that Lisa does not
depend on artificial life support; has no more than six months to live; is not pressured or
coerced by anybody else to end her life; and is fully conscious and mentally competent.
So far, Lisa's decision to commit suicide-whether physician-assisted or not-seems as
rational and voluntary as such a decision can ever be. i"' Committing suicide would
maximize Lisa's autonomy by maximizing her control over how and when her
impending death occurs; both Lisa' preference for no suffering to suffering and her belief
that death is the only means to this end are reasonable; and Lisa reasonably believes that
her family supports her decision for the right reasons-because they too wish her
suffering to end and not to spare them the burden of taking care of her or save them the
expense of Lisa's continued medical care.
What, then, justifies the inference from the fact that Lisa's decision to commit
suicide is rational and voluntary to the conclusion that physician-assisted suicide is
warranted? Why should Lisa's method of suicide involve a physician's prescription of a
lethal medication? Why can't Lisa terminate her life in some other way? An analogy
with abortion might help to answer these questions. Most "pro-choice" advocates-i.e.,
advocates for keeping the option of abortion legal-argue that if abortion were made
illegal, many pregnant women would then seek "back-alley" abortions. And back-alley
abortions are undesirable for two primary reasons, one practical, the other moral. The
practical reason is that the individuals performing the back-alley abortions are likely to
lack the knowledge, skill, and resources necessary to perform safe abortion procedures
and would therefore expose these women to serious bodily injuries. The moral reason is

11. It has been suggested to me in personal conversation that a patient's decision to terminate her life while
undergoing a sharp surge of pain is not rational. My response to this point is that the patient's decision is
rational if the patient has been informed by her doctor that she is terminally ill and can reasonably expect to
suffer this level of pain, either constantly or continuously, until death. Moreover, even if this decision is
irrational, all fifty States allow such alleged irrationality in the case of withdrawal of lifesaving medical

treatment. Scholars who accept the proposition that a patient can rationally request physician-assisted suicide
include Robert L. Barry, Breaking the Thread of Life: On Rational Suicide (Transaction Publishers 1994) and
Jamison, supra n. 85, at 42 ("The overwhelming majority of mental health professionals, according to surveys

conducted by James Werth and Barbara Liddle, believe that individuals can make rational decisions to control
the time and manner of their deaths."); see also Justice Stevens' concurrence in Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 747

(patients may make a "rational and voluntary decision to seek assistance in dying."). Scholars who reject this
proposition (i.e., those who accept what Jamison, supra n. 85, at 41, refers to as the "traditional view") include

Callahan, supra n. 96, at 66-67; Kathleen Foley (testifying before Congress in 1996), Herbert Hendin (of The
American Suicide Foundation), Kass, supra n. 36, at 24-25.
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that the illegal status of these abortions would imply that society regards abortions in
general-and therefore the women undergoing these back-alley abortions-as morally
reprehensible. And pro-choice advocates reject both this moral conclusion and the
assumption that society endorses this moral conclusion.
Advocates of physician-assisted suicide would likely argue that keeping this
practice illegal produces practical dangers and conveys the wrong message. The
practical danger is that patients will seek to end their lives in ways that may not be
effective, thereby complicating their situation and quite possibly increasing the
patients'-and their families'-suffering. And the message conveyed by keeping
physician-assisted suicide illegal is that it is wrong for doctors to help patients like Lisa
end their lives. But advocates of physician-assisted suicide argue that Lisa's doctor is
doing the right thing by helping Lisa to execute her fully rational and family-supported
decision. That is precisely what doctors should do. After all, doctors routinely
implement, as they should, their patients' decisions to terminate lifesaving medical care
and administer palliative but death-hastening treatment. And there is no principled
distinction between these two methods and physician-assisted suicide. In all three
situations, a patient asks her doctor to help alleviate her suffering, and the doctor respects
her patient's request by prescribing, dispensing, and/or administering to her patient a
drug that has the reasonably foreseeable effect of causing the patient to die earlier than
she would have without the drug.
Moreover, physician-assisted suicide has a distinctive advantage over withdrawal
of lifesaving medical treatment and administration of palliative but death-hastening
treatment: it liberates the patient from any sense that she is committed to carrying
through with her decision to terminate her life. If a patient decides to administer the
lethal substance to herself, she may still change her mind before executing her decision
without worrying that this change of mind will yield any negative consequences. But if a
patient asks her doctor to withdraw treatment or administer palliative but death-hastening
treatment, she may feel reluctant to change her mind for fear of disappointing or
bothering the doctor and losing eligibility for the same treatment the next time she
112

requests it.

B.

The Undue PressureArgument
While the policy arguments for physician-assisted suicide in Part IV.A are strong,

112. Brody uses this same psychological point to argue that if physician-assisted suicide is allowed, the
lethal substance should be administered by the patient herself rather than by the doctor. See Brody, supra n.

97, at 1386. But see Cohn & Lynn, supra n. 102, at 249-50 ("Because of either patient condition or incorrect
dosing, many patients will be unable to swallow or keep the pills down. This raises the probability that
assistance beyond prescribing lethal medications will be essential and may even suggest that active euthanasia,
or lethal injection, would be more effective and likely would seem more humane. Furthermore, the question of
how to deal with a failed attempt remains, particularly if that act has rendered the patient worse off or unable to
request or complete another attempt."); Edmund D. Pellegrino, Compassion Is Not Enough, in Foley & Hendin,
supra n. 7, at 46 ([lI]n fact, self-administered prescriptions may fail in a significant number of cases. As a
result, the act of dying may be prolonged and unpleasant. The dose of the lethal medication may well have to
be repeated or replaced by direct euthanasia. If this is so, it would require the physician to administer the dose,
or to be present and ready to accelerate death more directly if the first effort fails. Assisted suicide quickly
becomes direct and active euthanasia with the transfer of power from the patient to the physician - the
antithesis of the expression of autonomy so many seek.").
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they are not strong enough. They are counteracted by even stronger policy arguments
againstphysician-assisted suicide. Importantly, the latter arguments apply with greater
force to physician-assisted suicide than to withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment or
palliative but death-hastening treatment, a point that will be defended in Part IV.F
The Undue Pressure Argument predicts that legalizing physician-assisted suicide
will put serious financial pressure on terminally ill patients, especially terminally ill
patients who are poor, to choose this option rather than the option of lifesaving medical
treatment. Because physician-assisted suicide will be significantly cheaper than lifesustaining treatments, it is highly likely that Medicare and Medicaid officials, health and
life insurance companies, viatical settlement companies, and managed care plans-all of
which are concerned at least to minimize their costs and possibly to maximize their
profits-will much more frequently recommend against lifesaving medical treatment
than they would have if the much cheaper option of physician-assisted suicide were not
available as a legal alternative. 113
Needless to say, this situation would be highly undesirable. We do not want
patients choosing-no less being forced to choose-physician-assisted suicide simply for
financial considerations. For, first, financial considerations are simply the wrong kind of
basis for decisions that have such significant non-financial-i.e., personal, interpersonal, and spiritual/religious-significance and ramifications. Second, the financial
pressure may be so overwhelming that it would render many less affluent patients'
114
decisions to elect physician-assisted suicide non-voluntary and non-consensual.
This financial pressure will only be compounded by psychological pressure as
well. Too many terminally ill patients wish to die because they feel-or, worse, have
been made to feel-like annoying nuisances to their families and doctors. 115 Legalizing
physician-assisted suicide would simply intensify this guilt and therefore the "subtle
coercion" on these patients to take this now legally available route. When physicianassisted suicide is illegal, patients do not have to justify their failure to exercise this
option. It is simply not an option in the first place. If anything, they would have to
justify why they still wish to die in spite of this legal roadblock. But if physicianassisted suicide were legalized, then the burden would suddenly fall on patients to justify
why they are continuing to live-and thereby inconveniencing everybody around them
for the indefinite future-rather than choosing this now legally available alternative.
And they will feel themselves unable to satisfy this burden precisely because they will
have internalized the attitude of rejection that they perceive all around them. They will
deem themselves unworthy of continued existence precisely because everybody else
116
around them deems them unworthy of continued existence.
113. See Cohn & Lynn, supra n. 102, at 238-39; Stephanie Graboyes-Russo, Too Costly to Live: The Moral
Hazards of a Decision in Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 907, 919-924
(1997); Jamison, supra n. 85, at 37.
114 See Graboyes-Russo, supra n. 126, at 925-27.
115. See Cohn & Lynn, supra n. 102, at 257-59; Graboyes-Russo, supra n. 126, at 925-28; Jamison, supra
n 85, at 37; Kass, supra n. 36, at 22-30; Pellegrino, supra n. 85, at 48.
116 See Kass, supra n. 36, at 24; Martha Minow, Which Question? Which Lie? Reflections on the
Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases, 1997 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 21 (One of two "lies" the Court told in Vacco and
Glucksberg was that permitting physician-assisted suicide "would not systematically and routinely be used to
push dying people into death .... [T]he problem arises from the inauguration of a regime in which people
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The Too Early Argument
The patients who would feel themselves unable to satisfy this burden (of justifying

their continuing to live) would then be dying too early-too early relative to when they
would have died had their preferences been optimized.' 17 As a society, we simply don't
want people choosing to die prematurely for the wrong reasons. And one very wrong
reason would include a sense of worthlessness, a sense that one is not worth the
inconvenience and financial hardships that one's continuing to live might impose on
1
others. 18

Of course, an advocate of physician-assisted suicide might respond that even if the
Too Early Argument applies to some patients, it does not apply to Lisa. Therefore if
physician-assisted suicide were legalized, it should be restricted to patients in Lisa's
situation-again, terminally ill with no chance of recovery, less than six months to live,
and suffering excruciating pain.
Even then, however, Lisa may be dying too early. If she is suffering excruciating
pain, death is not the only possible means of escape. She still has the option of palliative
care. And if she, for some reason, does not have this option, then she should be given it.
For this approach would enable Lisa to overcome her pain and thereby to enjoy another
day, another week, another month, or even another six months of life. Physician-assisted
suicide wipes out this possibility entirely. It simply destroys the possibility of recovery
and, with it, the prospect of continuing a life of value.
There are very few situations in which palliative care, when made available, is

insufficient to alleviate a patient's pain and suffering.

19

Unfortunately, it is not always

would have to justify continuing to live. Rooting the permission in a right or protected interest ... would not
save individuals from pressures to die imposed directly or indirectly by family members, physicians, managed
care providers, or the patients' own sense of guilt and burden." (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original)).
These arguments are especially applicable to terminally ill patients who are disabled. See Diane Coleman, Not
Dead Yet, in Foley & Hendin, supra n. 7; Evan J. Kemp, Jr., Could You Please Die Now? DisabledPeople Like
Me Have GoodReason to Fearthe PushforAssisted Suicide, Wash. Post Cl (Jan. 5, 1997); Julie G. Madorsky,
Is the Slippery Slope Steeper for People with Disabilities? 166 W. J. Med. 410 (1997); Anita Silvers,
Protectingthe Innocents: People with Disabilitiesand Physician-AssistedDying, 166 W. J. Med. 407 (1997).
117 SeeCohn& Lynn, supran. 102,at 241.
118. For different versions of the Too Early Argument, see Harvey M. Chochinov and Leonard Schwartz,
Depression and the Will to Live in the PsychologicalLandscape of Terminally Ill Patients, in Foley & Hendin,
supra n. 7; Cohn & Lynn, supra n. 102, at 243, 247, 257-59; Coleman, supra n. 129, at 224; Council on Ethical
& Jud. Affairs, supra n. 1, at 2231; Kass, supra n. 36, at36; Cicely Saunders, A Hospice Perspective,in Foley
& Hendin, supra n. 7, at 289.
119. See Callahan, supra n. 96, at 65; Cohn & Lynn, supra n. 102, at 258; Kass, supra n. 36, at 23. Still, it
must be acknowledged that in atleast some situations, even the most advanced palliative care fails to reduce
patients' suffering to a tolerable level. See Justice Breyer's concurrence in Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 791-92;
Brief of the Coalition of Hospice Professionals in Vacco and Glucksberg, 1996 WL 709342 at **6-7 (Dec. 10,
1996); Brody, supra n. 97, at 1385; Michael H. Levy, Medical Management of CancerPain, in Principlesand
Practiceof Pain Management 235 (Carol A. Warfield ed., McGraw Hill 1993); New York State Task Force on
Life and Law, supra n. 42, at40; Rawls et al , supra n. 8,at 44; Timothy E.Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case
of IndividualizedDecision Making, 32 N. Eng. J. Med. 691, 694 (Mar. 1991); Timothy E. Quill, Christine K.
Cassel, & Diane E. Meier, Care of the Hopelessly Ill: Proposed Clinical Criteriafor Physician-Assisted
Suicide, 327 N. Eng. J. Med. 1380, 1383 (Nov. 1992); Student Author, supra n. 36, at 247 n. 98; Vacco,
Respt.'s Br., supra n. 60, at 8-9.
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made available. 12 But this is not an argument for physician-assisted suicide. This is an
argument for improving the current situation and extending adequate palliative care to
12 1
every patient who needs it.
Too many patients like Lisa wish to die because they suffer less from physical pain
and more from "psychic" pain-i.e., because they are depressed, hopeless, or terrified.
Once again, death is not the only means of escape from these feelings. Not only
palliative care but also adequate psychiatric care, in conjunction with love and support
from family and friends, provides a more desirable means. This is a more desirable
means because, unlike an early death, it serves intrinsically desirable ends. Psychiatric
care can help patients like Lisa to enjoy life again, recognize how valued and valuable
they are, conquer their despair, fulfill more goals, indulge in pleasant memories, come to
terms with their past failures, make amends for previous misdeeds, reconcile with people
they may have neglected or cut off, share more quality time with their family and friends,
and generally find greater meaning in their lives and experiences. 122 Unfortunately, like
palliative care, adequate psychiatric care is not always made available either. But once
again, this is not an argument for physician-assisted suicide. It is an argument for
extending adequate psychiatric care to every patient who needs it.
D.

The Trust Argument

The Trust Argument proceeds in two parts. 12 3 The first part suggests that a patient
is entitled to believe that her physician has her best interests in mind. Without this
entitlement, she will be less likely to confide in her physician. And the less likely she is
to confide in her physician, the less likely she will be to give her physician all of the
information that the physician needs in order to give her optimal treatment. All else
being equal, then, there is a direct correlation between the level of a patient's trust in her
physician and the level of medical care that she receives. Whatever works to diminish
the former will also work to diminish the latter.
The second part of the Trust Argument suggests that if physician-assisted suicide
were legalized, then diminished trust and inferior medical care would likely result. If
physician-assisted suicide were legalized, then a patient who is, or even just appears to
be, terminally ill might very well worry that her physician secretly intends to kill her
either because the physician thinks that killing the patient is in the patient's best interest
or because the physician regards the patient's continued existence as an unnecessary
burden on the doctor herself, on the patient's family, or on society. As a result, the
patient may not tell her physician everything she needs to know. Indeed, she may even

120. See Cohn & Lynn, supra n. 102, at 241, 243-44; Foley & Hendin, supra n. 7, at 2, 3-4, 14.
121. See Chochinov and Schwartz, supra n. 131, at 269-70; Cohn & Lynn, supra n. 102, at 243-44, 260;
Kathleen Foley, Compassionate Care, Not Assisted Suicide, in Foley & Hendin, supra n. 7; Graboyes-Russo,
supra n. 126, at 934; Kass, supra n. 36, at 36; Pellegrino, supra n. 85, at 50; Saunders, supran. 131, at 285-86,
289.
122. See Chochinov & Schwartz, supra n. 131, at 270-77; Kass, supra n. 36, at 38-39; Pellegrino, supra n.
85, at 50; Saunders, supra n. 131, at 287-88, 290-91.
123. For similar versions of the Trust Argument, see Cohen-Almagor, supra n. 94, at 200; Council on
Ethical & Jud. Affairs, supra n. 1, at 2232; Jamison, supra n. 85, at 34-35; Loewy & Loewy, supra n. 92, at
116; Gaylin et al., supra n. 85; New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, supra n. 42, at 105-06; Kass,
supran. 36, at 27-29; Orentlicher, supra n. 30, at 664.
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refrain from seeing a physician altogether.
E.

The Slippery Slope Argument

Finally, the Slippery Slope Argument makes an even more ominous prediction
than do the Undue Pressure Argument and the Trust Argument. The Slippery Slope
Argument predicts that if physician-assisted suicide is legalized, then both the message
of this legal measure itself as well as the fact that some or many physicians will end up
killing their patients will ultimately change society's view of physicians and generate
devastating psychological and sociological problems.] 24 Once physician-assisted suicide
has the stamp of lawfulness, both the physicians who implement it as well as their
colleagues will increasingly tend to regard killing as "not so bad," a "necessary evil."
And as the practice becomes more and more commonplace, some of them might even
come to regard such killings as useful. Some more opportunistic (and malevolent)
physicians might come to regard physician-assisted suicide as an all-too-convenient
means of "weeding out" the "weakest" or "least desirable" members of society. Inspired
by their ideas of what society should look like and their notions about who belongs and
who does not, they may actually use their positions of authority to pressure vulnerable
patients who were otherwise opposed to dying to change their minds. Even worse, they
may attempt to manipulate patients who were not even terminally ill in the first place to
1 25
consider the option.
This is called the Slippery Slope Argument because it predicts that the legalization
of physician-assisted suicide will generate a slippery slope toward a much greater
number of premature deaths. 126 Indeed, as proponents of the Slippery Slope Argument
contend, precisely this situation occurred in Nazi Germany. 127 What started out as a
"small" euthanasia program designed to kill "only" the most feeble-minded members of
society eventually grew into the Final Solution. It has been well-documented that
underlying this dramatic expansion in social engineering was an equally dramatic
transformation in physicians' attitudes toward life, death, and killing. 12 8 The more
commonplace and socially accepted killing by physicians became, the more inured they
became to the act of killing itself. And the more inured they became to the act of killing,
the more inclined they were to broaden their conceptions of "weak," "undesirable," and
"unworthy of life" to include members of society other than the mentally incompetent.
This "brutalization" or "desensitization" to the value of human life eventually
spread in part from physicians to society in general. Because physicians tended

124.
n. 42,
125
Kass,
126.

See Loewy & Loewy, supra n. 92, at 115-16; New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, supra
at 107, 109, 112-13.
See Cohen-Almagor, supra n. 94, at 188-89; Davies, supra n. 93, at 90; Jamison, supra n. 85, at 43;
supra n. 36, at 23-28; Loewy & Loewy, supran. 92, at 121-24; The EuthanasiaReport 4 (1988).
See Callahan, supra n. 96, at 61; Cohen-Almagor, supra n. 94, at 188-89; Jamison, supra n. 85, at 36-

39; Loewy & Loewy, supra n. 92, at 108-09, 124-26; George J. Annas, The PromisedEnd-Constitutional
Aspects of Physician-AssistedSuicide, 335 New Eng. J. Med. 683 (1996); Herbert Hendin, Chris Rutenfrans &
Zbigniew Zylicz, Physician-AssistedSuicide and Euthanasiain the Netherlands: Lessons from the Dutch, 277
J. Am. Med. Assn. 1720 (1997); Madorsky, supra n. 129; Orentlicher, supran. 30, at 664.
127. See e.g. Loewy & Loewy, supra n. 92, at 124-26; Sprung, supra n. 85, at 2214-15.
128. See generally Robert Jay Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide
(Basic Books 1986).
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increasingly to regard certain human beings as "life unworthy of life," and because
physicians commanded such high respect, their attitudes and actions inevitably helped to
soften the rest of society's opposition to killing. Of course, physicians in Nazi Germany
were aided by other societal forces such as propaganda, ethnic prejudice, and terror. But
the point remains that physicians played an instrumental role in helping to
bring about
129
the changes in attitude that would eventually make the Holocaust possible.
F. Why These Arguments Apply with GreaterForce to Physician-AssistedSuicide than
to Withdrawal of Lifesaving Medical Treatment
The main reason that physician-assisted suicide constitutes more of a threat than
withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment is because, all else being equal, it is
psychologically less difficult-easier-for a doctor to carry out. Physician-assisted
suicide is easier because it helps to increase the "distance" between the doctor's actions
and the patient's death. While withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment requires the
doctor to perform acts that lead directly to the patient's demise, physician-assisted
suicide permits the doctor merely to write a prescription and let the patient "do the
rest" -i.e.,
administer the lethal substance to herself. As a result, legalization of
physician-assisted suicide is likely to lead to the result that some, and therefore too
many, patients are permitted to die not for the right reason-i.e., because they fall into
the very small category of terminally ill patients for whom adequate palliative care is
medically unavailable-but rather for the wrong reason that their doctors simply have
less psychological resistance to this option.
V.

CONCLUSION

While the United States Supreme Court declined in Vacco and Glucksberg to
extend constitutional protection to physician-assisted suicide, it recently held in Gonzales
that States may still legalize physician-assisted suicide. So as things stand now, whether
or not a given patient has the legal right to elect physician-assisted suicide depends on
what her state legislature has said on the matter. So far, only Oregon has legalized this
practice. The other forty-nine States have not. If the position taken by this article is
correct, the other forty-nine States should not follow Oregon's example primarily for
policy reasons.
Still, this is hardly a categorical stance. Unlike strictly ethical reasons, policy
reasons can be undermined by empirical data. So where we go from here largely
depends on what has happened, and is happening, in Oregon, the United States' very
own physician-assisted-suicide "laboratory." 130 If an objective assessment of the data-

129. See Cohen-Almagor, supra n. 94, at 190 Brian Kalt discusses the implications of physician-assisted
suicide for the "ethical integrity of the medical profession," which he abbreviates as "ELIMP." See generally
Brian C. Kalt, Death, Ethics, and the State, 23 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 487 (2000).
130. Much work has already been done in this area. For essays that offer a negative assessment of the
Oregon experience, see Kathleen Foley and Herbert Hendin, The Oregon Experiment, in Foley & Hendin,
supra n. 7; N. Gregory Hamilton, Oregon's Culture of Silence, in Foley & Hendin, supra n. 7; David W.
Kissane, Deadly Days in Darwin, in Foley & Hendin, supra n.7. For a more sanguine assessment primarily of
physician-assisted suicide in the Netherlands, secondarily of physician-assisted suicide in Oregon, see Amanda
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including physician surveys, psychiatric reports, and family and patient interviewsindicates that too many patients have exercised physician-assisted suicide for the wrong
reasons (e.g., treatable pain or depression or worries about being a nuisance or economic
burden to one's family), then this practice should not only not be adopted elsewhere but
should be abandoned in Oregon as well. Otherwise, if an objective assessment of the
data indicates that the "Oregon experiment" has succeeded and physician-assisted
suicide has been chosen only by the small minority of patients for whom palliative and
psychiatric care was provided but still failed sufficiently to alleviate their suffering, then
it should arguably remain legal in Oregon and be adopted by other States, as long as the
same restrictions and safeguards are carefully codified and strictly enforced.

Gardner, Dutch Euthanasia Rates Steady After Legalization, available at http://www.medicinenet.com/script/
main/art.asp?articlekey-81027.
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